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A quantum secure direct communication network scheme is proposed with quantum superdense
coding and decoy photons. The servers on a passive optical network prepare and measure the
quantum signal, i.e., a sequence of the d-dimensional Bell states. After confirming the security of
the photons received from the receiver, the sender codes his secret message on them directly. For
preventing a dishonest server from eavesdropping, some decoy photons prepared by measuring one
photon in the Bell states are used to replace some original photons. One of the users on the network
can communicate any other one. This scheme has the advantage of high capacity, and it is more
convenient than others as only a sequence of photons is transmitted in quantum line.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Hk
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, a novel branch of quantum communication,
quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) was pro-
posed and actively pursued by some groups [1, 2, 3, 4, 5,
6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15]. Different from QKD, the
goal of QSDC is that the two parties of communication,
say Bob and Charlie can exchange the secret message
directly without generating a private key first and then
encrypting the message. The scheme proposed by Beige
et al. [1] can be used to transmitted the secret message
after the transmission of an additional classical bit for
each qubit. Yan and Zhang [2] proposed a QSDC proto-
col with quantum teleportation. Gao, Yan and Wang [3]
introduced a QSDC protocol with quantum entanglement
swapping. Man, Zhang and Li [4] presented a QSDC
protocol with entanglement swapping too. Zhu et al.
[5] proposed a QSDC protocol with Einstein-Podolsky-
Rosen (EPR) pairs based on the encryption on the order
of the transmission of the particles, similar to that in the
QKD protocol [16]. Wang, Zhang and Tang [6] revised
this QSDC protocol with single photons, and Li et al. [7]
improved its security against Trojan horse attack. The
secret message in all these QSDC protocols can be read
out by the receiver only after at least one bit of classi-
cal information is exchanged for each qubit. More accu-
rately, they are some deterministic secure quantum com-
munication protocols pointed out by Li et al. [17], and
are very useful for deterministic communication when the
noise in a quantum line is not very low. Bostro¨m and
Felbinger [8] proposed an interesting ping-pong QSDC
following some ideas in quantum dense coding [18] with
an EPR pair even though Wo´jcik [19] proved that the
∗E-mail: fgdeng@bnu.edu.cn
ping-pong protocol is insecure for direct communication
if there are losses in a practical quantum channel and
we [20] showed that it can be eavesdropping with multi-
photon fake signal fully if there is noise in the quantum
channel. Cai and Li [9] improved the capacity of ping-
pong protocol. We put forward a two-step QSDC pro-
tocol [10] with EPR pairs transmitted in block and an-
other one based on a sequence of polarized single photons
[11]. Wang et al. introduced a QSDC protocol with high-
dimensional quantum superdense coding [12] and another
one with Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) states [13].
The good nature of the QSDC schemes [10, 11, 12] with
quantum data block is that the participants can perform
quantum privacy amplification [21, 22] on the unknown
states to improve their security in a noisy channel. Lee,
Lim and Yan [14] introduced a protocol for controlled
secure direct communication with GHZ states. Cao and
Song proposed a QSDC protocol with W state and tele-
portation [15].
A practical quantum communication requires that any
one on a passive optical network can communicate an-
other authorized user, similar to a classical communica-
tion network, such as the world wide web (i.e., www)
and the classical telephone network. Usually, there are
some servers (the number of the servers is much less than
that of the users), say Alices who provide the service for
preparing and measuring the quantum signal for the le-
gitimate users on a passive optical network, which will
reduce the requirements on the users’ devices for secure
communication (not the servers) largely, same as the clas-
sical communication. By far, there are few any-to-any
QSDC network schemes [23] although there are some
point-to-point QSDC schemes [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9,
10, 11, 12, 13, 14] existing, which is different from QKD
[24, 25, 26]. Moreover, the existing QSDC point-to-point
schemes [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14] cannot
be used directly to accomplish the task in a QSDC net-
2work except for the two-step QSDC protocol [10]. The
reason is that a dishonest server can steal some infor-
mation without being detected. In order to be practical
and secure, the security of a QSDC network must be
guaranteed against a dishonest server as the number of
server is larger than one. For example, when the point-
to-point QSDC schemes in Refs [2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13]
are used for QSDC network directly, the server Alice can
steal the information by using the intercepting-resending
attack without disturbing the quantum signal as she pre-
pares it and knows its original state [27]. The QSDC
network protocol in Ref. [23] is composed of three two-
step point-to-point QSDC schemes. All the particles in
the EPR pairs should be transmitted from the server to
the sender and then to the receiver before they run back
to the server. In 2005, Gao, Yan and Wang [28] proposed
a QSDC protocol for a central party and his agents. The
quantum information can only be transmitted from the
agents to the center, not any one to any one on the net-
work.
In this paper, we will introduce a QSDC network
scheme following some ideas in quantum superdense cod-
ing [18, 29] with an ordered N EPR photon pairs. One
authorized user can communicate any one on the network
securely with the capability of measuring d-dimensional
single-photon states. In this scheme, only one particle in
each EPR pair is transmitted, which will make it more
convenient than that in Ref. [23]. The decoy photons
will ensure its security.
II. THE QSDC NETWORK WITH
SUPERDENSE CODING
In general, the structure of a QSDC network is as the
same as that for quantum key distribution [24, 25, 26].
There are two kinds of topological structures for QSDC
networks, a loop one or a star one, shown in Fig.1. The
QSDC network can work similar to QKD network [25].
That is, the classical message transmitted by any of the
authorized users can be gathered by the server Alice
through the identity authentication in a different time
slot, and the sender Bob and the receiver Charlie can
distinguish their identities each other. This task can be
accomplished with a classical channel in which the clas-
sical message can be eavesdropping, not be altered [36].
The server Alice provides the service for preparing and
measuring the quantum signal, which will reduce the re-
quirements on the users’ devices largely. For each request
of the users, the server analyzes it and then performs a
relevant operation, for example, connecting the user to
another one on the network or sending a sequence of pho-
tons to the user. If two users do not exist in a branch of
the network, they can agree that the server of the branch
with the receiver provides the service for preparing and
measuring the quantum signal, and the other servers only
provide the service for connecting the quantum line for
these two users in some a time slot. In this way, the
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FIG. 1: The topological structure of the network, similar to
those in Refs. [24, 25, 26]. (a) star-configuration network; (b)
loop-configuration network.
principle of a QSDC network is explicit if we can de-
scribe clearly that of its subsystem, shown in Fig.2. We
only discuss the principle for QSDC with the subsystem
of the network below.
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FIG. 2: The subsystem of networks in this QSDC network.
The server Alice always keeps the sequence SA and sends SB
firs to the receiver of the secret message, Charlie who encrypts
them with the operations UC .
A symmetric d-dimensional EPR photon pair is in one
of the Bell-basis states as following [18, 29]
|Ψnm〉AB =
d−1∑
j=0
1√
d
e2piijn/d|j〉A ⊗ |j +m mod d〉B (1)
where n,m = 0, 1, ..., d − 1, and A and B are the two
3photons in an EPR pair. The unitary operations
Unm =
d−1∑
j=0
e2piijn/d|j +m mod d〉〈j| (2)
can transform the Bell-basis state
|Ψ00〉AB =
∑
j
1√
d
|j〉A ⊗ |j〉B (3)
into the Bell-basis state |Ψnm〉AB, i.e., (IA ⊗
UBnm)|Ψ00〉AB = |Ψnm〉AB. Here IA is the identity ma-
trix which means doing nothing on the photon A, and
UBnm are only operated on the photon B. The two sets of
unbiased measuring bases (MBs) can be chosen similar
to those in a two-dimensional quantum system, labeled
as Zd and Xd. Let us define the Zd -MB which has d
eigenvectors as following:
|0〉 , |1〉 , |2〉 · · · , |d− 1〉 . (4)
The d eigenvectors of the Xd -MB can be described as
|0〉x = 1√
d
(|0〉+ |1〉 + · · · + |d− 1〉) ,
|1〉x = 1√
d
(
|0〉+ e 2piid |1〉+ · · ·+ e
(d−1)2pii
d |d− 1〉
)
,
|2〉x = 1√
d
(
|0〉+ e 4piid |1〉+ · · ·+ e
(d−1)4pii
d |d− 1〉
)
,
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
|d− 1〉x = 1√
d
(|0〉+ e
2(d−1)pii
d |1〉+ e
2×2(d−1)pii
d |2〉+ · · ·
+e
(d−1)×2(d−1)pii
d |d− 1〉). (5)
The two vectors |k〉 and |l〉x coming from two MBs sat-
isfy the relation |〈k|l〉x|2 = 1d , and the Hadamard (Hd)
operation
Hd =
1√
d


1 1 · · · 1
1 e2pii/d · · · e(d−1)2pii/d
1 e4pii/d · · · e(d−1)4pii/d
...
... · · · ...
1 e2(d−1)pii/d · · · e(d−1)2(d−1)pii/d


(6)
can realize the transformation between the states com-
ing from the Zd -MB and the Xd -MB, i.e., Hd|j〉 = |j〉x.
Certainly, there are at most d+ 1 sets of unbiased mea-
suring bases for people to prepare and measure a d-
dimensional quantum system [30]. Let us assume that
the users use M MBs for preparing and measuring their
quantum signals.
For the quantum communication, the server Alice
prepares a sequence of EPR pairs, an ordered N d-
dimensional photon pairs, in the same state |Ψ00〉AB.
She takes one photon (A) from each entangled photon
pair to make up an ordered partner photon sequence,
say the sequence SA: [P1(A), P2(A), . . ., PN (A)], same
as Ref. [10]. Here the subscript numbers are the orders
of the N EPR pairs. The remaining partner photons in
the photon pairs make up the other sequence, say SB:
[P1(B), P2(B), . . ., PN (B)]. Here Pi(A)Pi(B) are the
two photons in the i-th EPR pair. Different from the
QKD network schemes [24, 25, 26], the server Alice first
sends the sequence SB to the receiver Charlie, and al-
ways keeps the sequence SA by herself, depicted in Fig.1.
Charlie chooses one of the two modes, a small proba-
bility p with the checking mode and a large probability
1 − p with the coding mode, for the photons received.
If he chooses the checking mode, Charlie requires Alice
perform the measurements on the correlated photons in
the sequence SA with M MBs first, and then tell him
the results. Charlie measures the samples with the same
MBs as those of Alice’s and analyzes the error rate of the
samples. If the coding mode is chosen, Charlie operates
each photon in the sequence SB with one of the d × d
local unitary operations {Unm} (n,m = 0, 1, 2, . . . , d− 1)
chosen randomly, say UC . For the eavesdropping check of
the transmission between Charlie and Bob, Charlie picks
up some samples distributing randomly in SB and re-
places them with the decoy photons which are prepared
by Bob with one of the M MBs chosen randomly. He
sends the sequence SB to Bob. After the confirmation of
the security of the transmission, Bob codes his message
on the sequence SB with the corresponding local uni-
tary operation Uij , say UB. He sends the sequence SB
to Alice who performs the joint Bell-basis measurements
on the photon pairs and announces the results. Before
his coding, Bob chooses k photons in SB and operates
them with choosing randomly one of the unitary opera-
tions {Unm}, and uses them for the eavesdropping check
in the transmission from Bob to Alice.
After the security of the transmission of one batch ofN
order entangled photons is confirmed, the user codes the
message on the photons and then sends them to the server
Alice. The operation UC done by the receiver Charlie is
used to hide the message (i.e., the operation UB) coded
by the sender Bob, and the decoy technique is used to
forbid the dishonest server to steal the information about
the operation UC freely. In this way, the QSDC network
is performed until the communication session is ended.
Now, let us describe the steps for the subsystem of our
QSDC network scheme in detail as follows.
(S1) The server Alice prepares a sequence of EPR pho-
ton pairs in the same state |Ψ00〉AB, and she divides them
into two partner photon sequences SA and SB. That is,
she takes the photon A in each photon pair |Ψ00〉AB to
form the sequence SA, and the other photons make up
the sequence SB. Alice sends the sequence SB to the
receiver of the secret message, Charlie, and always keeps
the sequence SA at home.
(S2) After receiving SB , Charlie checks the security
of the transmission by the following method. (a) Charlie
chooses randomly some photons from the sequence SB as
the samples for eavesdropping check. (b) Charlie requires
4Alice to measure the correlated photons in SA with the
M MBs chosen randomly, and tell him the results and her
MBs. (c) Charlie takes the suitable measurements on the
corresponding photons in his samples with the same MBs
as those of Alice’s. (d) Charlie analyzes the error rate by
comparing his results with Alice’s to determine whether
Eve is monitoring the quantum line. This is called the
first eavesdropping check. If the error rate is very lower
than the threshold ǫt, they continue the quantum com-
munication to the next step, otherwise they will discard
the results and repeat the quantum communication from
the beginning.
(S3) Charlie encrypts each photon in SB by choosing
randomly one of the local unitary operations {Unm}, say
UC , and then sends the sequence SB to the sender of
the secret message, Bob. For the second eavesdropping
check, Charlie chooses randomly some of the photons in
SB as the samples, and replaces them with the decoy
photons, say se1, prepared in advance with choosing ran-
domly one of the M MBs before they are sent to the
quantum line. He keeps the secret about the positions
and states of these samples.
(S4) Bob and Charlie take the second eavesdropping
check with some samples. They can accomplish this task
with the following method. (a) Charlie tells Bob the po-
sitions of the decoy photons se1 and their states. (b)
Bob takes the suitable measurements on the photons in
se1 with the correlated MBs. (c) Bob compares his re-
sults with those of Charlie’s and determines whether the
transmission of the sequence SB from Charlie to Bob is
secure. If the transmission is secure, the quantum com-
munication is continued to the next step, otherwise it will
be aborted and repeated from the beginning.
(S5) Bob codes his secret message on the photons re-
mained in SB with the corresponding local unitary oper-
ation Uij , say UB, according to his secret message. He
picks up some of the photons in SB as the samples se2 for
checking the security of the whole quantum communica-
tion. That is, he performs randomly one of the operations
{Unm} on each sample. Bob sends the sequence SB to
the server Alice.
(S6) Alice performs the joint d-dimensional Bell-basis
measurements on the EPR photon pairs and publishes
the results, say UA.
(S7) Charlie and Bob check the security of the whole
quantum communication with the samples se2. If the
error rate of the samples is reasonably low, Charlie can
read out the secret message UB as UA = UCUB. Also,
they can use some special techniques to correct the errors
in the secret message, similar to the two-step protocol
[10].
III. DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY
It is obvious that the present protocol is secure if the
process of the quantum communication between Charlie
and Bob is secure. As the principle of the security in
a quantum communication protocol depends on the fact
that an eavesdropper’s action can be detected by analyz-
ing the error rate of the samples chosen randomly with
statistical theory. In essence, the procedure for analyz-
ing the error rate of the samples in this paper is same
as that in the BB84 QKD protocol [31] and its modi-
fied version, the favored-measuring-basis QKD protocol
which has been proposed by Lo et al. [32] and proven
to be secure unconditionally. That is, the authorized
users choose randomly M MBs to prepare and measure
the samples. So the security of this protocol is similar
to those in the BB84 protocol and its modified version
with quantum privacy amplification [33]. Moreover, it
appears that high-dimensional quantum communication
protocols provide better security than that obtainable
with two-dimensional quantum systems, as has been dis-
cussed in detail in Ref. [34] because the two authorized
users can use more than two sets of unbiased measur-
ing bases to check eavesdropping. Suppose that the two
authorized users use M sets of unbiased MBs to check
eavesdropping, the error rate introduced by Eve’s eaves-
dropping is in principle ǫe =
Md+1−M−d
Md . If d = 3 and
M = 4, ǫe = 50% which is twice of that in BB84 QKD.
That is, Eve’s action will introduce more errors in the
results obtained by the two authorized users with mea-
surements on the decoy photons and then be detected
easily. Bechmann-Pasquinucci and Peres gave out the
four unbiased MBs for three-dimensional quantum sys-
tem in Ref. [34]. In this time, the MB Z3 can be chosen
as
|0〉, |1〉, |2〉, (7)
and the MB X3 as
|x0〉 = 1√
3
(|0〉+ |1〉+ |2〉), (8)
|x1〉 = 1√
3
(|0〉+ e2pii/3|1〉+ e−2pii/3|2〉), (9)
|x2〉 = 1√
3
(|0〉+ e−2pii/3|1〉+ e2pii/3|2〉). (10)
The two other bases can be taken as
1√
3
(e2pii/3|0〉+ |1〉+ |2〉) and cyclic permutation, (11)
and
1√
3
(e−2pii/3|0〉+ |1〉+ |2〉) and cyclic permutation. (12)
In a low noise quantum channel, the entanglement purifi-
cation technique [35] for high-dimensional quantum sys-
tem can be used to reduce the information leaked about
the operation UC .
It is worth pointing out the advantage that the se-
quence SB is sent first to the receiver Charlie, not the
sender Bob. The server Alice cannot steal the secret
message yet if she is dishonest. That is, Charlie first en-
crypts the quantum states which will be used to carry
5the secret message, by choosing randomly one of the lo-
cal unitary operations {Unm}, and then sends them to
the sender Bob. The operations done by Charlie UC
is equivalent to the quantum key in quantum one-time-
pad crypto-system [11, 36] if Alice or an eavesdropper
does not eavesdrop the quantum line between Charlie and
Bob. On the other hand, it is necessary for Charlie and
Bob to exploit the decoy technique to forbid the server
Alice to eavesdrop the quantum line between Charlie and
Bob freely and fully. If there are no decoy photons in SB,
Alice can read out the operation UC fully by intercept-
ing the sequence SB when it is transmitted from Charlie
to Bob and take the Bell-basis measurements on the N
order EPR photon pairs. Fortunately, the decoy photons
inserted by Charlie can prevent Alice from stealing the
information about the quantum key UC as Alice’s eaves-
dropping will leave a trace in the results of the samples
se1, same as that in the high-dimensional BB84 QKD
protocol [34]. That is, the powerful eavesdropper, Alice
will leave a trace in the outcomes of the decoy photons
as they are prepared with some unbiased MBs randomly
and Alice has no information about them, including their
positions and their states. Moreover, the eavesdropping
done by Alice in the quantum line between Charlie and
Bob can only obtain some information about the key UC ,
not the secret message UB at the risk of being detected.
Charlie and Bob can reduce the information leaked with
quantum privacy amplification.
In essence, the coding done by the users is performed
only after they confirm the security of the transmission
in this QSDC network scheme, same as the two-step
QSDC protocol [10] which is secure as an eavesdropper
cannot steal the information about the secret message,
similar to Bennett-Brassard-Mermin 1992 QKD proto-
col [37, 38, 39]. The eavesdropping on the quantum
line between Alice to Charlie or Bob to Alice will be
found out when Bob and Charlie analyze the error rate
of the outcomes of the Bell-basis measurement on the
EPR photon pairs on which Bob chooses randomly one
of the local unitary operations Unm. And the eavesdrop-
ping can only obtain the combination of the two opera-
tions UA = UCUB which will be announced in public. In
this way, the three processes, Alice to Charlie, Charlie to
Bob, and Bob to Alice, for the transmission of the pho-
tons SB are similar to that between the sender and the
receiver in the two-step QSDC protocol [10]. If all the er-
ror rates are reasonably low, the present QSDC network
scheme can be made to be secure with some other quan-
tum techniques, such as quantum privacy amplification,
entanglement purification, quantum error correction, and
so on.
As for the decoy photons, Charlie can also prepared
them without another single-photon source. He can pro-
duce them with measurements. That is, Charlie requires
Alice to choose n1 + n2 photons in SA as the samples in
the process for the first eavesdropping check. Alice mea-
sures all these n1+n2 photons by choosing randomly the
MB Zd or Xd, and publishes their states. But Charlie
only measures n1 photons in his corresponding sampling
photons in SB, and keeps the other n2 photons as the
decoy photons. As Charlie completes the error rate anal-
ysis for the first eavesdropping checking by himself, it is
unnecessary for him to publish the outcomes and posi-
tions of the sampling photons measured by Charlie. He
need only publish the result that the error rate is reason-
able low or not. In this way, none knows which photons
are the decoy ones and their states. Also, Charlie can
choose some unitary operations to change the basis of a
decoy photon. This good nature will reduce the require-
ments on the users’ devices as they need not have an ideal
single-photon source in their quantum communication.
As the quantum data in QSDC schemes [2, 3, 4, 5, 10,
11, 12] should be transmitted with a block, the present
QSDC network scheme with quantum storage technique
will have a high source capacity as each photon can carry
2log2d bits of information. Even though the this tech-
nique is not fully developed, it is believed that this tech-
nique will abe available in the future as it is a vital ingre-
dient for quantum computation and quantum communi-
cation and there has been great interest [40] in develop-
ing it. As only a sequence of photons SB is transmitted
in the present QSDC network scheme, it is more conve-
nient than others [23]. The users need only exchange a
little of classical information for checking eavesdropping
and the server publishes a bit of classical information for
each qubit, the present scheme is an optimal one from
the view of information capacity exchanged.
For implementing this QSDC network, high-
dimensional quantum systems are required. At
present, people can choose polarized photons as the
two-dimensional quantum systems for this QSDC
network without difficulty. Another feasible candidate
of quantum information carriers may be the phases
of photons. Recently, people employ orbital angular
momentum states of photons to carry more information
for communication [41]. With the improvement of
technology, the generation and manipulation of high-
dimensional quantum systems become convenient and
their application to optical communications is feasible.
In summary, a scheme for quantum secure direct com-
munication network is proposed with superdense coding
and decoy photons. After confirming the security of the
transmission, the user on the network codes his secret
message on the quantum states which has been encrypted
by the receiver with one of the local unitary operations
{Unm} chosen randomly. For preventing the dishonest
server from eavesdropping, the receiver picks up some
samples from the sequence received and replaces them
with the decoy photons which can be produced with mea-
surements and unitary operations before he sends the se-
quence to the sender. An authorized user on the network
can communicate another one securely. This scheme has
the advantage of high capacity as each photon can carry
2log2d bits of information and it is more convenient than
others [23] as only a sequence of photons is transmitted
in quantum line.
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